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Abstract—We study the following private data transfer prob-
lem: Alice has a database of files. Bob and Cathy want to access
a file each from this database (which may or may not be the
same file), but each of them wants to ensure that their choices
of file do not get revealed even if Alice colludes with the other
user. Alice, on the other hand, wants to make sure that each
of Bob and Cathy does not learn any more information from
the database than the files they demand (the identities of which
will be unknown to her). Moreover, they should not learn any
information about the other files even if they collude.
It turns out that it is impossible to accomplish this if Alice,
Bob, and Cathy have access only to private randomness and
noiseless communication links. We consider this problem when a
binary erasure broadcast channel with independent erasures is
available from Alice to Bob and Cathy in addition to a noiseless
public discussion channel. We study the file-length-per-broadcast-
channel-use rate in the honest-but-curious model. We focus on
the case when the database consists of two files, and obtain the
optimal rate. We then extend to the case of larger databases, and
give upper and lower bounds on the optimal rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the following problem: Alice has a database
of files (e.g., she runs a video-on-demand service). Bob and
Cathy are her customers who want to access a file each from
this database, but they want to ensure that their choices of
file are not revealed, even if Alice colludes with the other
customer. Alice, on the other hand, wants to make sure that
each of her customers does not learn any more information
from the database than the files they have demanded (the iden-
tities of which will be unknown to her), and if the customers
collude they do not learn any more than the collection of files
they asked for. We will require that the privacy guarantees
are unconditional (i.e., information theoretic). We call this the
private data transfer problem.
This problem is an instance of secure multiparty compu-
tation (SMPC) [4], where several mutually distrusting users
wish to communicate with each other over a network in order
to compute functions of their distributed, private inputs. At
the end of such a computation, no user learns any more
information about any private data than what is revealed by
its own input and output.
It is known that for unconditionally secure computation of
general functions, private randomness and noiseless commu-
nication are insufficient [7]. This holds even when the users
are honest-but-curious, i.e., they follow the protocol faithfully,
but will infer forbidden information from the random variables
they accumulate over the protocol’s execution. Indeed, it can
be shown that private data transfer described above cannot be
achieved if Alice, Bob, and Cathy only have private random-
ness and noiseless communication (pairwise and/or public).
Additional noisy resources, in particular a noisy channel, have
been proposed [5] as a resource to enable secure computation
in such settings. In this paper we will consider a (noisy)
broadcast channel from Alice to Bob and Cathy as a resource
for achieving private data transfer.
We study private data transfer over binary erasure broadcast
channels for databases of size two. There are several problems
which are very closely related to our problem.
(i) Oblivious transfer (OT) is a family of two-party secure
computation primitives, a specific version (namely 1-of-2
string OT), is as follows: Alice and Bob are two-parties
with Alice having 2 equal length strings of which Bob
wants exactly one string without Alice finding out the
identity of the string Bob wants. Alice wants to ensure
that Bob receives information about only one of the two
strings. The connection to our problem will be explored
in greater length below.
(ii) Private information retrieval (PIR): Our problem can
be viewed as a version of the PIR problem [3], [12]
with symmetric privacy requirements. In the PIR problem
(with asymmetric privacy requirement), a user wants to
retrieve an element from a database held by one or more
servers such that each server does not learn the identity
of the database element retrieved. The symmetric version,
where the servers also want to ensure that the user does
not learn anything more than the element retrieved, has
also been studied. The key difference with our work
is that previous works have considered only noiseless
communication. Under this, it is impossible to achieve
PIR with a single server (as in our problem setting)
with an information theoretic guarantee even for the
asymmetric privacy requirement. The standard approach
is to consider multiple servers (who all do not collude).
Here, we consider a single-server PIR problem with
symmetric privacy requirements in the honest-but-curious
setting, but allow the use of a (noisy) broadcast channel.
To achieve OT, it is known that a noisy resource such as a
noisy channel between Alice and Bob is necessary, even when
Alice and Bob are honest but curious. For the 1-of-2 string
OT described above, OT capacity of a discrete memoryless
channel (DMC) is the largest string length (in bits) that Bob
can obtain per use of the DMC. For honest-but-curious users,
Nascimento and Winter [10] obtained a lower bound on the
string OT capacity of DMCs and source distributions.
Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2] obtained lower bounds on the
string OT capacity of generalized erasure channels when users
are honest-but-curious. For erasure probability at least 12 , these
lower bounds are tight. Pinto et. al. [11] showed that, for
erasure probability at least 12 , the capacity of this model
remains unchanged even when the parties are malicious, that
is, even when the parties may arbitrarily deviate from the
protocol.
This 2 party string OT setup was generalized to the case of
a wiretapped channel and the honest-but-curious OT capacity
of the case of binary erasure broadcast channels was character-
ized both for 2-privacy (where the eavesdropper might collude
with either user) and 1-privacy (no collusion allowed) in [8].
A further generalization is when Alice-Bob and Alice-Cathy
want to perform independent OTs using a (noisy) broadcast
channel from Alice to Bob and Cathy, i.e., Alice has two pairs
of strings, Bob is necessarily interested in a file from the first
pair and Cathy from the second pair. Mishra el al [9] studied
the optimal trade-off between the rates of the first pair and
the second pair for a binary erasure broadcast channel and
obtained inner and outer bounds for the 2-privacy rate-region
in the honest-but-curious setting.
Our data transfer problem can be seen as a variant of the
setup of [9], where Alice now has a collection of N strings.
Bob and Cathy each want to independently pick up one of the
strings. A straight forward approach for N = 2 is to invoke
the achievable scheme of [9] for the symmetric rate point by
setting both pairs as the same. However, this turns out to be
sub-optimal, in general. We propose a scheme and prove its
optimality. For the general N case we give upper and lower
bounds for the optimal rate.
Section II defines the problem for the case of a database
with two files and gives our main result which completely
resolves this problem. In section III, we describe the protocol
which is used to prove the achievability part of our main result.
Appendix B has the proof of the converse part of our main
result. The result is extended to the case of a database with
more than two files in Section IV where we give upper and
lower bounds on the optimal rate.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MAIN RESULT FOR A
DATABASE WITH TWO FILES
Alice Bob
Cathy
pY Z|X
Public Channel
K0,K1 U
W
X Y
Z
KˆU
KˆW
Fig. 1: Setup for private data transfer over a broadcast
channel
For simplicity we first consider the case of a database
with two files. Alice’s private database is made up of two
Alice Bob
Cathy
BEC(ǫ1)
BEC(ǫ2)
Public Channel
K0,K1 U
W
X Y
Z
KˆU
KˆW
Fig. 2: Setup for private data transfer over broadcast channel
consisting of independent binary erasure channels
equal sized files (bit-strings) K0,K1 which are m-bit long
each. Bob and Cathy have choice bits U and W respec-
tively. K0,K1, U,W are independent and uniform over their
respective alphabets. By U we will denote U = U ⊕ 1, the
complement of U .
The goal is for Bob to obtain KU and Cathy to obtain KW
without any additional information about the database and the
choice variables being revealed to any single user or pairs of
users, e.g., Alice on her own should not learn anything about
U,W ; Alice and Bob working together should not learn any
information about W ; Bob on his own should not have any
information about W,KU ; Bob and Cathy working together
should not learn anything about KU in case U = W ; and so
on. We assume that the users are honest-but-curious.
In the setup in Figure 1, Alice can communicate to Bob
and Cathy over a memoryless broadcast channel pY,Z|X . In
addition, there is a public channel which is noiseless and has
unlimited capacity. Alice, Bob and Cathy can send messages
over this public channel and each such message will be
received by all users.
Definition 1: Let n,m ∈ N. An (n,m)-protocol is an
exchange of messages between Alice, Bob, and Cathy over
the setup of Figure 1. Here m is the length of each bit
string in Alice’s private database and n is the number of
uses of the broadcast channel she makes. Before each channel
transmission and also after the last channel transmission,
Alice, Bob and Cathy can exchange an arbitrary but finite (with
probability 1) number of messages over the public channel,
taking turns to send each such message. The messages ex-
changed over the public channel and the channel transmissions
are allowed to be randomized, but the parties may only use
private randomness to accomplish this. The rate R of an
(n,m)-protocol is defined to be R := m/n.
We denote by F the transcript of the public channel at the end
of an (n,m)-protocol.
Definition 2: The final view of a user is the set of random
variables that the user observes or generates over the duration
of the (n,m)-protocol. The final views of Alice, Bob and
Cathy are, respectively,
VA := (K0,K1, X
n,F), (1)
VB := (U, Y
n,F), and (2)
VC := (W,Z
n,F). (3)
Definition 3: A rate R is an achievable 2-private data
transfer rate if there exists a sequence of (n,m)-protocols
with rate R such that as n −→∞, we have
P [KˆU 6= KU or KˆW 6= KW ] −→ 0 (4)
I(KU ;VB , VC |U =W ) −→ 0 (5)
I(U ;VA, VC) −→ 0 (6)
I(W ;VA, VB) −→ 0 (7)
I(U,W ;VA) −→ 0 (8)
I(W,KU ;VB) −→ 0 (9)
I(U,KW ;VC) −→ 0. (10)
Definition 4: The 2-private data transfer capacity C2P for
the setup of Figure 1 is the supremum of all achievable 2-
private data transfer rates.
In this paper, we study the specific instance of independent
binary erasure broadcast channel (shown in Figure 2), where
pY Z|X = pY |X · pZ|X and where pY |X is a binary erasure
channel BEC(ǫ1) with erasure probability ǫ1, and pZ|X is a
BEC(ǫ2).
Our main result is a characterization of the 2-private data
transfer capacity of the independent erasure broadcast channel.
Theorem 1:
C2P = min (ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1(1− ǫ2), ǫ1ǫ2) .
We prove this theorem in the next section by giving a protocol
which can achieve rates arbitrarily close to capacity and
proving a converse.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we first describe a protocol which will
be used to achieve 2-private data transfer capacity of the
setup of Figure 2. We note that the protocol described for
the setup in [9], though useful for the private data transfer
problem here, does not (in general) achieve the 2-private
data transfer capacity of the setup of Figure 2 (eg. consider
ǫ1 <
1
2 , ǫ2 ∈ (
1
2 ,
2
3 )). Before giving a formal description of
our protocol, we will outline its main ideas.
Alice begins by transmitting a sequence Xn of indepen-
dent, uniformly distributed bits, indexed by 1, 2, . . . , n, over
the broadcast channel. Bob and Cathy receive independently
erased versions Y n and Zn, respectively, of the transmitted
bits.
Let us consider the case ǫ1, ǫ2 ≤ 1/2. Bob has about nǫ1
erased bits in Y n, and he takes the indices of these bits as
the bad set B. Out of the indices of unerased bits in Y n, Bob
randomly picks a subset of indices, of the same cardinality
as B, and calls it the good set G. If U = 0, Bob assigns
(L0, L1) = (G,B), otherwise Bob assigns (L0, L1) = (B,G).
Bob sends (L0, L1) over the public channel. Notice that even
if Alice and Cathy get together, they will not learn U from
(L0, L1) that Bob sent over the public channel. This follows
from the independence of the erasure channels to Bob and
Cathy and the memoryless nature of erasures.
Cathy confines her attention to Zn|L0∪L1 , the restriction of
Zn to the indices in L0∪L1. In a manner similar to Bob, out of
Zn|L0∪L1 , Cathy forms her own good and bad sets of indices
G˜, B˜ respectively, each of size about 2nǫ1ǫ2. If W = 0, Cathy
assigns (L˜0, L˜1) = (G˜, B˜), otherwise Cathy assigns (L˜0, L˜1)
= (B˜, G˜). Cathy sends (L˜0, L˜1) over the public channel.
Alice forms two data transfer (DT) keys T00 and T11 as
(also see Figure 3):
T00 = X
n|L0∩L˜0 (11a)
T11 = X
n|L1∩L˜1 (11b)
Bob
Cathy L0 L1
L˜0
L˜1
T00
T11
Unerased
for
Bob
Erased
for
Bob
Unerased
for
Cathy
Erased
for
Cathy
Fig. 3: Illustration of the sets used in the protocol when
U =W = 0 and ǫ1, ǫ2 ≤ 12
Alice then sends the following encrypted strings over the
public channel :
M0 = K0 ⊕ T00,
M1 = K1 ⊕ T11.
Bob knows TUU . Hence, using MU , Bob can recover KU .
Also, Cathy knows TWW . Hence, using MW , Cathy can
recover KW . Bob, however, does not know anything about
TUU , and since KU is encrypted with TUU , he does not learn
anything about KU . Similarly, Cathy does not learn anything
about KW . If U = W , then even if Bob and Cathy get
together, they cannot learn anything about KU since TUU is
erased for both of them.
When ǫ1, ǫ2 > 12 , the size of L0, L1 is about n(1 − ǫ1)
each, and the size of L˜0, L˜1 is about 2n(1− ǫ2)(1− ǫ1) each.
Bob and Cathy have additional erased indices that they did
not use for sets B and B˜ respectively. Bob forms the set C
(of size n(2ǫ1− 1)) and Cathy forms the set C˜ (of size about
2n(1− ǫ1)(2ǫ2 − 1)) out of these unused erased indices (see
Figure 4) and declare them over the public channel. Thereafter,
Bob
Cathy L0 L1 C
L˜0
L˜1
C˜
T00
T11
Unerased
for
Bob
Erased
for
Bob
Unerased
for
Cathy
Erased
for
Cathy
Fig. 4: Illustration of the sets used in the protocol when
U =W = 0 and ǫ1, ǫ2 > 12
Alice-Bob get an additional rate using a two-party oblivious
transfer (OT) protocol [2] over Xn|C˜ . Notice that a two-party
protocol is appropriate since bits in C˜ are guaranteed to be
erased for Cathy. Similarly, Alice-Cathy get additional rate
using a two-party OT protocol over Xn|C . Thus, for ǫ1, ǫ2 >
1
2 , the protocol will rate-split the string K0 as (K˙0, K¨0) (and
similarly for K1) of appropriate lengths to perform the data
transfer in two parts. However, for all other regimes of ǫ1, ǫ2,
K˙0 = K0 and K˙1 = K1.
We now give a step-wise description of the protocol. See
Appendix E for more details on the set sizes and rate calcu-
lations mentioned in this protocol.
Protocol 1: Let δ > 0. Let r1 = min{ǫ1, 1 − ǫ1} − δ and
r2 = min{ǫ2, 1− ǫ2} − δ.
Alice Transmits a sequence Xn of independent, uniformly
distributed bits over the broadcast channel.
Bob Receives Y n from BEC(ǫ1). Bob’s set of erased and
unerased indices are
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi = erasure},
E := {i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Yi 6= erasure}.
If |E| < n(ǫ1 − δ) or |E| < n(1 − ǫ1 − δ), Bob
declares error. Otherwise Bob randomly picks the
following sets:
G ∼ Unif
{
A ⊆ E : |A| = nr1
}
,
B ∼ Unif {A ⊆ E : |A| = nr1} .
If ǫ1, ǫ2 >
1
2
C ∼ Unif {A ⊆ (E\B) : |A| = n(2ǫ1 − 1)}
else
C = ∅.
Now, depending on the value of U , Bob further
creates the sets L0, L1 as follows.
U = 0 : L0 = G, L1 = B
U = 1 : L0 = B, L1 = G
Bob sends L0, L1, C over the public channel.
Cathy Over the subset Zn|L0∪L1 , Cathy defines her set of
erased and unerased indices as
E′ := {i ∈ L0 ∪ L1 : Zi = erasure}
E
′
:= {i ∈ L0 ∪ L1 : Zi 6= erasure}
If |E′| < 2nr1(ǫ2 − δ) or |E
′
| < 2nr1(1 − ǫ2 − δ),
then Cathy declares error.
Otherwise Cathy randomly picks the following sets:
G˜ ∼ Unif
{
A ⊆ E
′
: |A| = 2nr1r2
}
B˜ ∼ Unif {A ⊆ E′ : |A| = 2nr1r2}
If ǫ1, ǫ2 >
1
2
C˜ ∼ Unif
{
A ⊆ (E′\B˜) : |A| = 2nr1(2ǫ2 − 1)
}
else
C˜ = ∅.
Now, depending on the value of W , Cathy further
creates the sets L˜0, L˜1 as follows:
W = 0 : L˜0 = G˜, L˜1 = B˜
W = 1 : L˜0 = B˜, L˜1 = G˜
Cathy sends L˜0, L˜1, C˜ over the public channel.
Alice forms the data transfer keys T00, T11 as in (11), and
sends the following strings over the public channel.
M0 = K˙0 ⊕ T00,
M1 = K˙1 ⊕ T11.
Bob knows TUU and, thus, can recover K˙U .
Cathy knows TWW and, thus, can recover K˙W .
Bob For ǫ1, ǫ2 > 12 , Bob selects a set S˜ ⊆ C˜ as follows:
if ǫ1 < ǫ2, Bob sets S˜ as the first n(2ǫ1−1)r2( 1
2
−δ)
bits of
C˜, otherwise Bob sets S˜ = C˜. See Appendix E-B
for more details.
Alice and Bob then follow the 2-party OT protocol
[2] using Xn|S˜ , with the inputs (K¨0, K¨1, U ).
Cathy For ǫ1, ǫ2 > 12 , Cathy selects a set S ⊆ C as
follows: If ǫ2 < ǫ1, Cathy sets S as the first
2nr1(2ǫ2−1)(
1
2
−δ)
r2
bits of C, otherwise Cathy sets
S = C. See Appendix E-B for more details.
Alice and Cathy then follow the 2-party OT protocol
[2] using Xn|S , with the inputs (K¨0, K¨1,W ).
Using this protocol we obtain the following achievability
result.
Lemma 1: For the setup of Figure 2, if R <
min (ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1(1− ǫ2), ǫ1ǫ2), then R is an achievable
2-private data transfer rate.
The proof of this lemma is deferred to Appendix A. The main
ideas used in the proof are the following:
• First, by Chernoff bound, the probability that the algo-
rithm will abort due to the size conditions not being met
is exponentially small.
• Bob knows TUU . Thus, from K˙U⊕TUU Bob can recover
K˙U .
• Cathy knows TWW . Thus, from K˙W ⊕TWW , Cathy can
recover K˙W .
• When U = W , colluding Bob and Cathy know nothing
about TUU since it is erased for both of them. Since
Alice’s transmissions always encrypt K˙U with TUU ,
colluding Bob and Cathy learn nothing about K˙U .
• Alice never learns either U or W . Note that Alice can
learn U or W only from the sets of indices she receives
from Bob and Cathy. In the setup, the channels act
independently of each other and independently on each
input bit. Further, the protocol ensures |L0| = |L1| and
|L˜0| = |L˜1|. Thus, Alice has no means of learning about
which sets of indices it receives correspond to erasures.
Also, since Alice learns nothing about U , we can show
that colluding Alice and Cathy cannot learn anything
about U either. Similarly, since Alice learns nothing about
W , colluding Alice and Bob cannot learn anything about
W .
Converse of Theorem 1
The converse of Theorem 1 is proved in Appendix B, where
we show the following general upper bound on C2P in the
setup of Figure 1:
C2P ≤
min
(
max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z),max
pX
I(X ;Z|Y ),max
pX
H(X |Y, Z)
)
.
Evaluated for the setup of Figure 2, this gives the required
upper bound.
IV. DATABASES WITH N > 2 FILES
The problem definition in Section II can be readily extended
to a database with N files; see Appendix C. Generalizing the
protocol and the converse (see Appendix D) from the last
section we can obtain the following upper and lower bounds
on the 2-private data transfer capacity. Let
RUB = min
(
ǫ2(1− ǫ1), ǫ1(1− ǫ2),
ǫ1ǫ2
N − 1
)
,
and
RLB =


ǫ1
N−1 ·
ǫ2
N−1 , ǫ1, ǫ2 ≤
N−1
N
ǫ1
N−1 · (1− ǫ2), ǫ1 ≤
N−1
N
, ǫ2 >
N−1
N
ǫ2
N−1 · (1− ǫ1), ǫ1 >
N−1
N
, ǫ2 ≤
N−1
N
(1 − ǫ1) · (1− ǫ2) +Rex, ǫ1, ǫ2 >
N−1
N
,
where
Rex = min((1 − ǫ2)(1−N(1− ǫ1)), (1 − ǫ1)(1−N(1 − ǫ2))).
Theorem 2:
RLB ≤ C2P ≤ RUB.
We note that the upper and lower bounds in Theorem 2 are
not very close, especially for large N . For instance, for erasure
probabilities less that 1− 1
N
, there is a factor of (N − 1) gap.
V. FUTURE WORK
Besides finding tighter bounds for the general N case,
there are several natural directions of enquiry: (i) the case
of more than two users, (ii) asymmetric case where privacy
is desired only on the choices, (iii) other channel models, (iv)
the malicious model where the dishonest users may deviate
from the protocol arbitrarily.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In this proof, we use a sequence {Pn}n∈N of Protocol 1 and
show that (4) - (10) hold for {Pn}n∈N. We consider the case
when either ǫ1 ≤ 12 or ǫ2 ≤
1
2 . The case where both ǫ1, ǫ2 >
1
2
involves an additional phase (as described in Section III) where
the well-understood 2-party OT protocol of [2] is invoked.
For ease of exposition, this case is not being considered here.
Hence, for the proof presented here, K˙0 = K0 and K˙1 = K1.
For the protocol Pn, we get rn = r1r2 −→ C2P , since
δ > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small for sufficiently large n.
Let J denote the event that either Bob or Cathy declares an
error during the protocol. Then, by Chernoff bound, P [J =
1] −→ 1 as n −→∞.
1) To show that (4) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N, we note that
P [KˆU 6= KU or KˆW 6= KW ]
= P [J = 0]P [KˆU 6= KU or KˆW 6= KW |J = 0]
+ P [J = 1]P [KˆU 6= KU or KˆW 6= KW |J = 1]
Since Pr[J = 0] → 0 exponentially fast, it is sufficient
to show that P [KˆU 6= KU or KˆW 6= KW |J = 1] −→ 0
as n −→∞.
Now, when J = 1, Bob knows TUU and, thus, recovers
K˙U . Similarly, Cathy knows TWW and, thus, recovers
K˙W . As a result, P [KˆU 6= KU or KˆW 6= KW |J = 1] =
0.
For the remaining part of this proof, we define the following
quantities for ease of notation:
G˙ = (G,B, G˜, B˜),
L˙ = (L0, L1, L˜0, L˜1)
M˙ = (M0,M1)
F˙ = (L˙, M˙)
2) To show that (5) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N, we note that
I(KU ;VB , VC |U =W )
≤ I(KU ;VB , VC , J |U =W )
=
∑
j=0,1
Pr[J = j] I(KU ;VB , VC |J = j, U =W )
+ I(KU ; J |U =W ).
Since Pr[J = 0] → 0 exponentially fast and
I(KU ; J |U = W ) = 0, it is sufficient to show that
I(KU ;VB , VC |U = W,J = 1)) −→ 0 as n −→ ∞.
Now,
I(KU ;VB , VC |U =W,J = 1)
= H(KU |U =W,J = 1)−H(KU |VB, VC , U =W,J = 1)
= H(KU )−H(KU |VB, VC , U =W,J = 1)
= H(KU )−H(K˙U |VB, VC , U =W,J = 1)
= H(KU )−H(K˙U |U,W, Y
n, Zn, F˙, U =W,J = 1)
= H(KU )−H(K˙U |U,W, Y
n, Zn, L˙, M˙, U =W,J = 1)
Now,
H(K˙U |U,W, Y
n, Zn, L˙, M˙, U =W,J = 1)
= H(K˙U |U,W, Y
n, Zn, G˙, M˙, U =W,J = 1)
= H(K˙U |U,W, Y
n, Zn, G˙, M˙, TUU , U =W,J = 1)
[TUU is a function of (G˙, Y n, Zn)]
= H(K˙U |U, M˙, TUU , U =W,J = 1)
[ since K˙U − (U, M˙, TUU , U =W,J = 1)− (W,Y n, Zn, G˙)
is a markov chain]
= H(K˙U |U, K˙U , K˙U ⊕ TUU , TUU , U =W,J = 1)
= H(K˙U |K˙U ⊕ TUU )
= H(K˙U )
So we get
I(KU ;VB, VC |U =W,J = 1) = H(KU )−H(K˙U )
= 0
3) To show that (6) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N, as before, it
will suffice to show that I(U ;VA, VC |J = 1) −→ 0.
I(U ;VA, VC |J = 1)
= I(U ;K0,K1,W,X
n, Zn, F˙|J = 1)
= I(U ;K0,K1,W,X
n, Zn, L˙, M˙|J = 1)
= I(U ;K0,K1,W,X
n, Zn, L˙|J = 1)
[ M˙ is a function of (K0,K1, Xn, L˙) ]
= I(U ;Xn, Zn, L˙|J = 1)
[U − (Xn, Zn, L˙, J = 1)− (K0,K1,W )]
= I(U ;Xn, L0, L1|J = 1)
[U − (Xn, L0, L1, J = 1)− (Zn, L˜0, L˜1)]
= I(U ;L0, L1|J = 1)
[U − (L0, L1, J = 1)−Xn]
= H(L0, L1|J = 1)−H(L0, L1|U, J = 1)
= H(L0, L1|J = 1)−H(G,B|U, J = 1)
= H(L0, L1|J = 1)−H(G,B|J = 1)
= 0
[ since (L0, L1), (G,B) have same distribution,
conditioned on J = 1 ]
4) The proof for showing that (7) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N
is similar to showing that (6) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N.
5) To show that (8) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N, it will suffice
to show that I(U,W ;VA|J = 1) −→ 0.
I(U,W ;VA|J = 1)
= I(U,W ;K0,K1, X
n, F˙|J = 1)
= I(U,W ;K0,K1, X
n, L˙, M˙|J = 1)
= I(U,W ;K0,K1, X
n, L˙|J = 1)
[ M˙ is a function of (K0,K1, Xn, L˙) ]
= I(U,W ; L˙|J = 1)
[U,W − (L˙, J = 1)− (K0,K1, Xn)]
= I(U ;L0, L1|J = 1) + I(W ; L˜0, L˜1|J = 1)
= H(L0, L1|J = 1)−H(G,B|J = 1)
+H(L˜0, L˜1|J = 1)−H(G˜, B˜|J = 1)
= 0
[ since (L0, L1), (G,B) have same distribution
and (L˜0, L˜1), (G˜, B˜) have same distribution
conditioned on J = 1 ]
6) To show that (9) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N, it will suffice
to show that I(W,KU ;VB|J = 1) −→ 0.
I(W,KU ;VB |J = 1)
= I(W,KU ;VB, TUU |J = 1)
[ since TUU is a function of VB ]
= I(W,KU ;VB,KU , TUU |J = 1)
[ since KU is a function of (VB, TUU ) ]
= I(W,KU ;U, Y
n, L˙, M˙,KU , TUU |J = 1)
= I(W,KU ;U, Y
n, L˙,KU , TUU ,KU ⊕ TUU |J = 1)
= I(W,KU ; L˜0, L˜1,KU ⊕ TUU |J = 1)
[ (W,KU )− (L˜0, L˜1,KU ⊕ TUU , J = 1)
−(U, Y n, L0, L1,KU , TUU ) ]
= I(W ; L˜0, L˜1|J = 1) + I(KU ;KU ⊕ TUU |J = 1)
= 0
7) The proof for showing that (10) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N
is similar to showing that (9) is satisfied for {Pn}n∈N.
APPENDIX B
CONVERSE OF THEOREM 1
The proof of converse is along the lines of the converse
arguments in [8, Lemma 5] (although it does not follow from
there). We first argue that following is a general upper bound
on C2P .
C2P ≤
min
(
max
pX
I(X ;Y |Z),max
pX
I(X ;Z|Y ),max
pX
H(X |Y, Z)
)
.
To see that C2P ≤ maxpX I(X ;Y |Z), suppose we run a
2-private data transfer protocol with U = 0 and W = 1
(both deterministic). Now K0 is a secret key between Al-
ice and Bob which is secret from Cathy. The bound fol-
lows from the fact [1] that the secret key capacity of the
broadcast channel pY Z|X with public discussion is upper
bounded by maxpX I(X ;Y |Z). Reversing the roles of Bob
and Cathy gives the second term. To prove that C2P ≤
maxpX H(X |Y, Z), consider running the data transfer proto-
col with U =W , a uniform bit. We may view this as a protocol
for two-party OT between Alice and the combination of Bob-
Cathy over the channel pY Z|X whose output is (Y, Z). The
bound follows from the two-party OT capacity upper bound [2]
of maxpX H(X |Y, Z). It is easy to evaluate these bound for
our binary erasure broadcast channel to obtain the converse:
maxpX I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ ǫ2(1−ǫ1), maxpX I(X ;Z|Y ) ≤ ǫ1(1−
ǫ2), maxpX H(X |Y, Z) ≤ ǫ1ǫ2.
APPENDIX C
PROBLEM DEFINITION FOR DATABASES WITH N > 2 FILES
The main difference is that Alice’s private database is now
made up of N strings K0,K1, . . . ,KN−1 which are m-bit
each. Let K = (K0,K1, . . . ,KN−1). Bob and Cathy have
choice variables U and W respectively which take values in
{0, 1, . . . , N−1}. K, U,W are independent and uniform over
their respective alphabets.
Alice’s view is now
VA := (K, X
n,F),
Bob and Cathy’s views are given by (2)-(3). The privacy
conditions (5) and (9)-(10) are replaced by
I(K\KU ;VB, VC |U =W ) −→ 0
I(W,K\KU ;VB) −→ 0
I(U,K\KW ;VC) −→ 0,
where by S\T we mean the ordered set S from which
corresponding elements in T have been removed. In addition,
we also have a condition to handle the case where U 6=W .
I(K\(KU ,KW );VB , VC |U 6=W ) −→ 0.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To prove the lower bound, we directly extend protocol 1 to
the case where Alice has N strings as follows:
• Bob now forms N sets L0, L1, . . . , LN−1, each of size
about nmin
(
ǫ1
N−1 , 1− ǫ1
)
. The set LU consists of
unerased indices of Y n and all other sets consist of erased
indices of Y n.
• Cathy confines her attention to Zn|L0∪L1∪...∪LN−1 and
forms her own sets L˜0, L˜1, . . . , L˜N−1, each of size
about Nnmin
(
ǫ1
N−1 , 1− ǫ1
)
min
(
ǫ2
N−1 , 1− ǫ2
)
.
Only set L˜W consists of unerased indices of
Zn|L0∪L1∪...∪LN−1 , the other sets contain erased
indices of Zn|L0∪L1∪...∪LN−1 .
• Alice forms the data transfer keys Tjj = Xn|Lj∩L˜j , j =
0, 1, . . . , (N − 1)
• Alice sends the encrypted strings Mj = Kj ⊕ Tjj , j =
0, 1, . . . , (N − 1).
• Similar to the last two steps of protocol of Section III,
both Bob and Cathy get extra data transfer rates, using
the 2-party OT protocol [2], when ǫ1
N−1 > 1 − ǫ1 and
ǫ2
N−1 > 1 − ǫ2. Alice and Bob use X
n|C˜ (which is
completely erased for Cathy) while Alice and Cathy use
Xn|C (which is completely erased for Bob) to obtain this
extra data transfer rate Rex. See Appendix E for details
of all rate calculations.
With this modified protocol, achievability of RLB follows
along the lines of the proof of Lemma 1.
The upper bound also immediately follows from the same
line of arguments used to establish the converse of Theorem 1
and a direct extension of the converse of [2] to 1-out-of-N
string OT.
APPENDIX E
COMPUTING SET SIZES AND DATA TRANSFER RATE
EXPRESSIONS
In this section, we will show how the sizes of the different
sets that Alice, Bob and Cathy create during the protocol have
been calculated. The sizes are given for arbitrary N (number
of files). We then derive the expression for the data transfer
rate that Bob and Cathy are guaranteed to get in any regime
of ǫ1, ǫ2. We finally derive the expression for the extra data
transfer rate that Bob and Cathy will get when ǫ1
N−1 > 1− ǫ1
and ǫ2
N−1 > 1− ǫ2.
A. Set Sizes
For ease of notation, let r1 =
(
min
{
ǫ1
N−1 , 1− ǫ1
}
− δ
)
and r2 =
(
min
{
ǫ2
N−1 , 1− ǫ2
}
− δ
)
.
• |E| = n(ǫ1 − δ)
• |E| = n(1− ǫ1 − δ)
• |Lj| = min
{
|E|
N−1 , |E|
}
= nr1, j = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1
• |C| =
{
|E| − (N − 1)|E|, |E|
N−1 > |E|
0, |E|
N−1 ≤ |E|
• |E′| = (|L0|+ |L1|+ . . .+ |LN−1|) · (ǫ2 − δ)
• |E
′
| = (|L0|+ |L1|+ . . .+ |LN−1|) · (1− ǫ2 − δ)
• |L˜j| = min
{
|E′|
N−1 , |E
′
|
}
= Nnr1r2, j = 0, 1, . . . , N−1
• |C˜| =
{
|E′| − (N − 1)|E
′
|, |E
′|
N−1 > |E
′
|
0, |E
′|
N−1 ≤ |E
′
|
B. Deriving Data Transfer Rate expressions
The data transfer rate that Bob and Cathy are guaranteed to
get in all regimes of ǫ1, ǫ2 is:
Rguaranteed =
1
n
|Tjj |
=
1
n
(
1
N
|L˜j|
)
=
1
n
(
1
N
Nnr1r2
)
= r1r2
Bob and Cathy get extra data transfer rates when ǫ1
N−1 >
1− ǫ1,
ǫ2
N−1 > 1− ǫ2. Alice and Bob use X
n|C˜ while Alice
and Cathy use Xn|C for getting this extra rate, using the two-
party OT protocol of [2].
The extra rate Bob can get is |C˜| · ( 1
N
− δ) while the extra
rate Cathy can get is |C|r2 = |C|(1− ǫ2− δ). However, since
Bob and Cathy can obtain only symmetric rate (see Section II
and Appendix C), the extra rate both Bob and Cathy get is :
Rex = min
{
|C˜| · (
1
N
− δ), |C|(1 − ǫ2 − δ)
}
